Is the Brady Plan an Effective Approach to Dept Management? by Jones, Stephany Griffith
Stephany Griffith Jones'
¡OS Sn//edn. 990. vo! 21 lic) I Instante of 0e clopinent Stncliec. Sussex
worthwhile to examine the reasons which made the
previously almost taboo subject of debt reduction
become almost universally acceptable in 1989, and
which led to it becoming a key element in the US
Treasury's new debt strategy.
Firstly, in debtor nations, impatience with adjustment
and negative net transfer burdens has clearly spread
from relatively limited circles of intellectuals to
strongly influence the political process, as parties
supporting a more radical stance on debt gained many
votes (e.g. in Mexico) or power (e.g. in Argentina).
More dramatically, the riots in Venezuela in February
1989, in which so many people were killed due to
protests against adjustment measures, illustrated the
deep resistance to cuts in living standards among the
poorer people in Latin America. In political and
popular circles in highly indebted countries massive
net transfers, linked to a large debt overhang, are seen
as a major cause for declining or stagnant living
standards and investment levels since 1982,
Increasingly these concerns are shared by repre-
sentatives of industrial governments, international
organisations, international banks and by public
opinion in industrial countries. The need to sustain
fragile and young democracies and the need to provide
some hope for a better future to people in highly
indebted countries are often quoted as reasons for the
need for a new debt strategy.
A strong intellectual case was made by influential
economists in the industrialised world, such as Paul
Krugman, John Williamson and Jeffrey Sachs, that
debt relief was in the economic interest of both debtors
and creditors. They - and others - argued that
excessive debt burdens act as a disincentive for debtor
countries (and governments) to take painful or
politically unpopular adjustment or stabilisation
measures, as the potential fruits or those measures
(e.g. as reflected in higher exports) will go in excessive
proportion to the creditors. Secondly, they pointed
out that attempts to extract full contractual debt
service risk provoking the debtors into a confrontation,
from which both they and the creditors will lose.
Furthermore, excessive debt burdens not only have
direct negative effects on the local economy,
particularly via lower investment, higher taxation
and/or higher inflation but also indirect ones, for
example, by discouraging capital flight repatriation.
Furthermore, it has been argued increasingly that by
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1. Introduction
Recently, we have seen a move towards the general
acceptance that there is a need for some kind of
debt/debt service reduction for heavily indebted
middle-income countries, the so-called HICs. This
was first reflected in the 1988 French and Japanese
initiatives, but became broadly accepted when US
Treasury Secretary Brady announced his plan in early
1989. The recognition that the debt problem is not just
a liquidity, but also a solvency problem is an
important step forward in dealing with the debt
overhang, which at least in Latin America, was
broadly viewed as the key obstacle to development in
the 1980s.
The initial debt management strategy (1982-85) had
assumed that the debt crises were temporary, and that
with much adjustment on the part of the debtors and
some 'involuntary lending' from the banks, the
problem would be overcome. It was insistently argued
that voluntary lending and LDC growth would return
to the 1970s pattern. At that time, those who argued
for debt reduction were treated as unnecessarily
radical.
By 1985, the desired results were clearly not achieved
and debtors were increasingly organised, as well as
beginning to take unilateral action to limit debt service
payments. The Baker Plan was introduced. Its rhetoric
was new - it argued for adjustment u'ith growth -
and the conditionality on new lending was expanded
to include long-term structural reforms, such as trade
lïberalisation and privatisation.
Though the latter was linked to increased lending by
the World Bank - and other multilateral bodies the
basic financing modality to handle the debt overhang
was not modified. Under Baker, countries were still
being lent more money so that they could get out of
debt! Debt reduction was still officially unacceptable,
though it began to be introduced informally in 1987
and 1988 (the Mexican Aztec bonds, and the donor
funded Bolivian buy backs being the precedents).
However, it was only with the Brady Plan - in early
1989 - that debt reduction finally became an
acceptable modality to deal with the debt overhang.
Before analysing the features of the new stage, it seems
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forgiving part of a country's debt creditors may
increase adjustment and desirable structural reforms,
which will increase future debt service capacity.
Finally, the need for debt/debt service reduction as a
key mechanism to reduce net transfer of financial
resources from highly indebted developing countries
to the industrial world is based on increased evidence
that there has been, and will be, very little new general
purpose bank lending to those countries.
The Brady Plan includes a number of innovative
elements. The first is that it explicitly recognises the
need for debt reduction and for reducing debt service.
(In fact, several debt reduction exercises had already
taken place when the Brady Plan was announced, with
explicit or implicit industrial government support.)
The second important element in the Brady initiative
is that the IMF and World Bank funds (as well as
contributions by governments, notably that of the
Japanese) will be made available to support debt
reduction operations. The mechanisms through which
this will be done include providing collateral for
discounted debt/bond exchange transactions and
replenishment of debtor resources cash buy-backs. It
is important to stress that both the funding and the
support of international financial institutions are
backing debt reduction; this is particularly interesting
because in the previous phases of the debt problem,
these institutions had - on the contrary - exerted
pressure on debtor governments to service their debts
in full. In fact, a third innovative element of the Brady
plan de-links disbursements of IMF and World Bank
programmes from agreements being reached with -
and debt being serviced to - private creditor banks.
2. Potential Problems with the Brady Plan
An important potential problem with the Brady Plan
is that banks are expected to participate voluntarily in
debt reduction or new money arrangements.
Ultimately, it may prove difficult or even impossible to
persuade a sufficient number of banks voluntarily to
reduce their aggregate claims on particular debtor
countries to levels that are sustainable - that is, fully
serviceable without compromising growth objectives.
When US Treasury Secretary Brady launched his plan
in March 1989 he argued that 'creditor governments
should also consider how to reduce regulatory,
accounting or tax impediments to aid debt reduction,
where they exist'.
However, changes in regulatory or fiscal aspects have
been promoted very slowly, particularly in Europe.
This may in part reflect the normal time lag between
political changes, policy formulation and imple-
mentation, particularly relevant in the context of such
a complex technical issue, which furthermore involves
important differences between countries. However, it
may reflect also to an important extent the differences
58
in objectives between those pursuing the reformulation
of the debt management strategy with a view to
focusing far more on debt/debt service reduction (e.g.
debtor governments and some part of the creditor
governments) and those in charge of banking
regulation supervision and taxation. This tension of
objectives emerged particularly clearly in a series of
interviews with European bank regulators, several of
whom argued that:
(j) the main concern of bank regulators and
supervisors is not to pursue the objective of the
Brady Plan, to facilitate debt and interest
reduction, but to safeguard the interest of the
depositors by defending the solvency of banking
institutions;
(ii) particularly as regards possible changes in fiscal
aspects, modifications suggested to encourage
debt/interest reduction are seen by regulators as
undesirable, not necessarily in the context of
Third World debt itself, but because it could set a
precedent for other (domestic) debtors.
The latter argument seems weakened by the fact that
special regulatory treatment has, for example, been
given already to a specific category of loans, without
this having a contagious effect. This occurred, for
example, in the US, where certain banks were in 1987
given preferential treatment on their agricultural loan
losses, without this serving as a precedent for other
cases.
Tax Incentives
As Brady stressed, the degree of success of his plan
could depend in part on incentives that governments
provide creditors with, to reduce their claims on
developing country debt. From recent statements it
would seem that US authorities are willing to be quite
flexible, compared to European ones, so as to aid the
implementation of the Brady Plan.
Perhaps the common regulatory feature in Europe and
Canada (as opposed to the US or Japan) is the
favourable attitude of the authorities to encouraging
loan loss provisions in general, and, in particular,
through tax deductability of such provisions.
US tax policy with respect to provisioning is the most
stringent, as only a small proportion of reserves
against LDC risk is currently tax deductible. It is now
clearly established that the decision of US banks to
make fairly large provisions in May 1987 was made
independently of any tax advantages.
As regards the tax advantages given to the European
banks to encourage their provisioning, there are two
schools of thought:
(j) Regulators in European countries and banking
analysts believe that the tax incentives provided
to banks have performed a positive role in the
international debt crisis management strategy,
mainly because (together with other factors) it
strengthened the banks against risk of insolvency
in case of Third World default or debt service
limitation. When pressed on the issue of
debt/debt service reduction, they argue that the
existence of large provisions makes feasible
debt/debt service reduction.
(ii) There is a second school of thought, which
convincingly argues that in fact the structure of
incentives in Europe discourages debt/debt
service reduction. Bouchet and May (1989) thus
emphasise that:
where banks are able to deduct loan loss reserves
from taxes there is little or no tax benefit to
recognising losses upon restructuring debt.
Where loan loss provisions are not tax deductible,
banks may have an incentive to accept
instruments that involve the recognition of loss in
order to receive the corresponding tax deductions.
Furthermore, they argue that:
one way to structure a policy environment that
encourages market-based debt reduction would
be not to allow banks to recognise tax losses for
provisioning or for secondary market trans-
actions which do not result in a realistic
restructuring of a debtor country's obligations
(and, thus some benefit for the debtor country).
Capital Requirements and Loan Loss Reserves
Tax treatment of loan loss provisions and of actual
losses due to debt/debt service reduction seem to be
the most crucial elements in determining banks'
attitudes to debt/debt service reduction. However,
another factor of importance is the link between loan
loss provisions and capital. This is being modified in
the context of convergence towards a common
measurement of capital adequacy within the new Basic
Agreement [Rodriguez 1989].
In countries, such as France, where reserves are
included in regulatory capital, banks are unlikely to
want to take losses and write down reserves.
Accounting conventions will require that losses be
recognised (though timing could be modified); as
Bouchet and Hay (1989) point out, encouraging losses
by writing down assets against provisions has a capital
cost for banks where reserves (as in France, and in the
US for general reserves) are included in regulatory
capital. The situation is different where (in countries
like the UK, Germany and Switzerland) loan loss
reserves are already excluded from capital, and thus
banks recognise no further capital loss when assets are
written off against reserves; these banks may not have
the disincentive to participate in voluntary debt
reduction that is present where loan loss reserves are
included in regulatory capital.
The problem will be reduced as the Basic Agreement
will impose near uniformity of treatment of loan loss
reserves by the end of 1990, the time at which, for
banks of all nationalities, loan loss reserves in excess of
1.5 per cent of risk-weighted assets will be excluded
from capital. Thus, at the end of 1990, French (and
US) banks would consider additions to loan loss
reserves to be a capital loss, in similar ways that a
British or German bank would. As a result, there
would be a more neutral impact on the willingness of
these banks to recognise limited losses, and the
distinction will tend to lose its importance for
debt/debt service reduction schemes, though it will
not disappear altogether.
3. Suggested Improvements to Support the
Brady Plan
In order to encourage banks to participate in the
Brady Plan it would be desirable for regulators in the
US to allow more favourable levels of provisioning for
participants of the Brady Plan.
As we have established, in Europe and Canada,
although there may be tax incentives at the time of
provisioning, there are no tax incentives to accept debt
or debt service reduction; there seems to be a strong
case that the high provisioning could in fact
discourage debt/debt service reduction.
It would seem desirable to design a tax policy for
Europe and Canada so as to ensure that sufficient (but
not excessive) levels of provisioning are maintained;
however, when a certain level of debt/debt service
reduction was agreed as desirable between a country and
the ¡MF/World Bank, banks could only maintain their
tax concessions if they participated in the debt/debt
service reduction exercise (or in equivalent contributions).
Such a policy would have several advantages:
(j) provisioning would still be encouraged by taxation
policy; (ii) at the same time debt reduction would also
be encouraged, as tax concessions could only be
maintained if banks participated in debt reduction
schemes; (iii) debt reduction would be conditional on
adjustment programmes agreed with the IMF (a
condition which would make it attractive to the
industrial governments).
If such a line were to be taken by tax authorities, it
would be particularly valuable if the position were
made clear and public, to provide signals to the banks.
Lack of knowledge and clarity about the future
reaction of tax authorities to changes in debt
management policies may inhibit the search for
innovative solutions, as bankers are less willing to be




strategy in which industrial governments induce,
encourage and nudge private banks towards some
debt/debt service reduction. In the context of the
Brady Plan it seems particularly essential to integrate
far more clearly than has been done until now,
discussions between regulators, fiscal authorities and
policy makers of different creditor nations to make
more consistent their policy objectives and measures.
As the Brady Plan is voluntary, it is most important
that countries' governments and authorities take the
initiative in encouraging their banks to participate,
rather than hope the banks will take part on their own
initiative. The Brady Plan is innovative, but it is
questionable whether it can ensure enough debt
reduction to have a significant effect.
One could argue that the Brady Plan would have been
more successful if it were more mandatory, forcing
banks to accept official decisions on the magnitude of
debt reduction. That issue will probably be examined
again in a couple of years. At present, it seems more
positive to suggest changes that might help the Brady
Plan work. One such change in the European context,
is the suggested modification of fiscal treatment of
provisions.
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Other Improvements
Regulatory bodies in different countries are very
diverse. Some European countries require provisions
against trade credits even when those credits are being
serviced.
Trade credit constitutes an essential lubricant in the
process of international trade. Having to reserve
against trade loans discourages banks from providing
essential short term financial flows even if they are
fairly secure.
Especially given the dramatic decrease in new lending
to the developing countries over recent years, trade
credit should be isolated from the international debt
problem. This is justified by the fact that short term
trade credit is provided through different institutional
modalities than other credits; furthermore, most
countries make a special effort to continue servicing
these short-term credits, even if they are unable or
unwilling to service the rest of their debts. In short,
trade credit is less risky than other forms of developing
country debt. Ideally, trade credits should not have to
be provisioned against unless there were strong
evidence that a country was unable or unwilling to
service them.
4. Conclusion
Changes in regulatory, fiscal and accounting policies
in creditor nations are particularly relevant in the
context of the Brady Plan, which stresses officially
supported, market based, voluntary debt reduction.
Regulatory and fiscal changes fit well as part of a
